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Abstract
This paper investigates safety requirements analysis of unmanned aero vehicle flight control law development. A 
unified approach integrating failure hazard identification and control law applicability assessment is proposed for 
systematic identification of flight control law safety requirements from failures of both flight control system and 
other airborne systems. A human hazard analysis approach based on human/machine interfaces is developed for 
identification of safety requirements on control law logic design for preventing pilot operating error in flight. 
Application of proposed approach on a demo vehicle indicates that the approach proposed in this paper is effective in 
identification of safety requirements for flight control law development.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Airworthiness 
Technologies Research Center NLAA, and Beijing Key Laboratory on Safety of Integrated Aircraft and 
Propulsion Systems, China
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1. Introduction
In recent years, unmanned aero vehicle (UAV) is developing rapidly worldwide[1]. One of the most 
valuable features of UAV is its pilot-offboard manipulation, which effectively eliminate the risk on pilot 
due to flight and mission[2]. However, this pilot-offboard characteristic deprives pilot’s capability to 
sense the vehicle’s real motion. In addition, communication data link between vehicle and control station 
generally has significant time delay, which may cause tendency to unsatisfactory handling qualities, even 
aircraft-pilot-coupling (APC). To fit this characteristic, flight control system (FCS) of UAV is generally 
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designed with UAV crew commanding outer loop parameters such as altitude, heading and airspeed, 
while inner loop manipulations like attitude control and stability augmentation accomplished by onboard 
flight control system automatically[3-4]. In this situation, if failures of flight control system or other 
airborne systems cause deviant fast dynamics, it is difficult for pilot in control station to correct or handle 
these abnormalities. Therefore, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Systems Airworthiness Requirements (USAR) 
[4] of NATO released in 2009 requires that, in flight control system:
There must be protection against adverse interaction of integrated components, resulting from a 
malfunction.
In addition, FCS of modern UAV generally has significant data and command interaction with other 
airborne systems. To avoid data error causing hazardous operations, the specification requires that:
Positive interlocks and sequencing of engagement to prevent improper operation are required (in FCS 
design).
Operation safety of UAV requires that more safety design should be incorporated in flight control law 
development to provide active safety protection.
In flight control system development, experienced flight control engineers might design safety logic
and algorithm in control law based on their experiences[5-7], which can effectively handle the possible 
unsafe conditions of flight control system, as well as other airborne systems. This experience-based design 
could cover a large part of unsafe condition of UAV operation which is already known to the engineers. 
However, when it comes to a vehicle with numerous new features, or when the control law engineers are 
not experienced enough, this experience-based approach could not guarantee sufficient coverage. A 
systematic safety approach is needed for requirement analysis, validation and verification of flight control 
law safety design.
To make the experience-based design more reliable, this paper proposes a systematic approach of 
safety requirement analysis, validation and verification for UAV flight control law safety design by 
incorporating the hazard identification concept of system safety analysis into control law development. 
Through a systematic identification and assessment of hazardous condition from both airborne system 
failure and pilot operation error, we form a list of unsafe condition which could be affected by flight 
control system. Required design features for preventing and handling these unsafe conditions provides 
fundamental requirements for safety design of flight control law. To assure that the identified safety 
requirements are implemented thoroughly and completely in control law development process, 
corresponding validation and verification approaches of identified safety requirements are also proposed. 
In the final part of this paper, we perform a control law safety requirements analysis of a UAV as a 
demonstration of the proposed approach.
2. Control Law Development Process and Safety Considerations
Control law development is a complicated and iterative system engineering process based on top-level 
development requirements. Fig 1 shows an overview of classical industrial control law development 
process[8]. The process mainly includes three parts: development requirement, controller synthesis and 
design, and test verification.
Focusing on the top-level requirements and design activities, we notice that:
• The primary design criteria of flight control law development, the flying quality requirements, such as 
MIL-F-8785C[9] and MIL-HDBK-1797[10], mainly focus on performance and function requirements 
of flight.
• Airworthiness regulations provide some safety requirements for control law design[11]. However, 
these requirements are established mainly from a perspective of final flight test. Also, regulation 
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requirements are generally not directly applicable to guiding design. Implementation of airworthiness 
requirements in control law design relies largely upon experience.
Fig. 1. Overview of typical flight control law development process[8]
• The overall process has no explicit analysis activities for control law safety requirements, which means 
safety design in control law development is mainly based on engineering experience, although partial 
safety design features could be included in controller synthesis and design process.
It can be seen from the above analyses that, establishing a systematic approach to form top-level safety 
requirements and assure its implementation in design process is necessary and valuable for safety design 
of flight control law development.
3. Control Law Safety Requirements Analysis and Design Implementation
3.1. Safety requirements analysis for control law development
Safety design of flight control law firstly needs top-level safety requirements. This requires a thorough 
identification of unsafe condition in UAV operation. To formalize the identification, we classify unsafe 
conditions of UAV operation into two categories according to their causes: unsafe conditions caused by 
airborne system failure, and unsafe conditions caused by human error.
(1) Requirements from unsafe conditions caused by system failure.
System failure could cause direct hazard to UAV operation, thus should be analyzed firstly. 
Traditionally, failures of airborne systems are handled by architecture design within each system 
individually. In modern UAV, failures of other systems could also be handled by flight control system 
due to close couple of functions between flight control and other airborne systems. Unsafe conditions 
identification of other systems could pose safety requirements on flight control law development. Thus, 
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unsafe conditions of all systems relating to flight control system should be analyzed to form a more 
complete safety requirement for flight control law design. When identifying unsafe conditions, flight 
mission unit should also be considered. Because system failures in different flight mission unit might 
cause different severity to UAV operation, thus forming different safety requirements for flight control 
law design.
In this paper, we use functional hazard analysis (FHA) approach from system safety assessment[12] 
for unsafe condition identification of each individual airborne system. Firstly, functions of each system 
are defined based on design requirement documents. Secondly, mission profile and basic mission units 
are formed from UAV design requirement documents. Then, possible failure conditions and resulting 
unsafe conditions are identified for each function, considering differences of failure effects in different 
mission units. Finally, hazardous failure condition list of all airborne systems are evaluated by flight 
control engineers to determine which failure conditions could be alleviated or eliminated by effects of 
flight control system, and how these effects could be realized by control law design. Requirements 
obtained from the above analysis are recorded and passed to control law design activities as part of top-
level safety requirement. The schematic process of this analysis approach is shown in Fig 2.
(2) Requirements from unsafe condition caused by human errors.
Operating errors of pilot and maintenance crew might cause unsafe condition to UAV operation[13-
14]. Appropriate judging logic in flight control law could probably prevent operating errors from causing 
hazardous effects. Because flight control law functions primarily in flight phases, human errors that could 
be prevented by flight control law logic are mainly pilot operating errors. Preventive effect of control law 
logic on maintenance errors is limited.
To obtain safety requirements for flight control law design, identification of possible human errors is 
required for each system function that has human/machine interface. Firstly, we analyze direct 
human/machine interfaces, required operating inputs and corresponding system reactions of each system. 
Then, possible pilot operating errors and corresponding effects are identified for each system function, 
Fig. 2. Control law safety requirements identification approach from system failures
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within basic mission unit to obtain a human hazard list. Finally, human hazards of all airborne systems are 
evaluated by flight control engineers to determine which errors could be prevented by effects of flight 
control system, and how these effects could be realized by control law logic design. The schematic 
process of this analysis approach is shown in Fig 3.
From the above systematic analysis, it is possible for flight control engineers to obtain a large set of 
safety requirements for flight control law design, which could be used as top-level requirements together 
with flying quality requirements and airworthiness requirements.
3.2. Validation of control law safety requirements
Before incorporating safety requirements obtained above into control law design, it is important to 
validate completeness, correctness and feasibility of the safety requirements.
• Completeness. It is necessary for analysts to check that all systems, functions, and human/machine 
interfaces are assessed without omission.
• Correctness. The requirements must be reviewed to assure that the analyses and conclusions are 
reasonable and correct. For requirements that can not be determined directly by experience, 
quantitative analysis, simulation, or flight tests should be planned for future development process to 
validate the correctness of original safety requirements.
• Feasibility. Feasibility of proposed safety requirements should be evaluated by flight control engineers 
to make sure that the safety requirements could be realized under current technical level.
Various validation approaches might be required for different safety requirements based on difficulty 
of determining effects of specific system failure or pilot error.
Fig. 3. Control law safety requirements identification approach from pilot errors
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• For failures or errors whose effects on UAV operation could be deduced directly, engineering judges 
based on experience is sufficient.
• For failures or errors whose effects could not be inferred directly from engineering experience, 
quantitative analysis or flight simulation might be required for validation of safety requirements.
• For failures or errors whose effects could not be inferred directly and has severe effects on UAV flight 
safety, more critical approaches, such as subscale model flight and flight test, might be required for
validation.
Complete input data, analysis data and output data should be documented for traceability. Validation 
activities should be recorded as evidence of process control.
3.3. Design verification of control law safety requirements
Implementation of safety requirements should be verified in control law development process. 
Verification of design implementation should include completeness and correctness.
• Completeness. Thorough examination of safety requirements to make sure that all requirements are 
implemented in flight control law design.
• Correctness. Verification that the control law designed could correctly accomplish the functions 
required by the safety requirements. Applicable approaches for correctness verification include offline 
simulation, iron bird simulation, ground test and flight test.
Different verification approaches might be required for different safety requirements. Evidence for 
demonstrating traceability and process control should be recorded for future reference.
4. Demonstration of Proposed Approach on Control Law Safety Requirements Analysis
Demo vehicle for this paper is a high aspect ratio, high-altitude, long-duration unmanned reccepiston 
of regular configuration, with two pairs of ailerons. Airborne systems of this UAV include flight control 
system, landing gear system, propulsion system, decelerating parachute system, etc. Mission units of this 
UAV include taxing, takeoff, patrol, surveillance, approach, landing, etc.
Attitude control is a basic function of UAV flight control system. Therefore, roll attitude control is 
chosen for control law safety requirement analysis from flight control system. When deriving control law 
safety requirements from other airborne systems, we chose nose wheel steering function of landing gear 
system as the candidate function, which is controlled by flight control system. Manual release function of 
decelerating parachute system is selected for control law safety requirements from pilot operating error.
4.1. Control law safety requirements from failures of flight control system
(1) Function definition
To perform a functional hazard analysis for roll attitude control of flight control system, we define the 
required essentials of the chosen function for FHA in Table 1.
(2) Unsafe condition identification
Applying standard FHA approach of SAE ARP-4761 to the rolling attitude control function, we got the 
failure conditions, effects and severe categories of the chosen function. Part of the FHA result is shown in 
Table 2.
(3) Safety requirements analysis for control law design
Among unsafe conditions in Table 2:
• Total loss of rolling control. Flight control system loses all capability of aileron control, causing flight 
control law unable to handle the effects of this failure condition. Therefore, safety requirements on this 
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unsafe condition should be guaranteed by architecture design and hardware redundancy of flight 
control system.
• Loss of single aileron. Partial of rolling control capability is lost, but rolling of the UAV is still 
controllable. The following requirements for control law design could be formed to handle this unsafe 
condition: a) flight control law should have monitor and diagnostic ability to each aileron; b) control 
law should be reconfigurable for loss of single aileron; c) manoeuvrability of UAV should be limited 
for flight safety after control law reconfiguration.
• Uncommanded deflection of single aileron. This failure condition might lead to out of control of UAV 
rolling motion. To handle this unsafe condition, cutoff of uncontrollable aileron should be incorporated 
in control, besides requirements identified above.
Table 1. Essential definitions of roll attitude control function
Function Roll attitude control
Activation Condition When flight control system is activated
Reaction Controlling rolling motion of UAV
Functional Phase All phases in flight
Related Systems Electric system, hydraulic system
Table 2. FHA results of rolling attitude control function (part)
Function Failure Conditions Phases Effects Classification
Rolling attitude 
control
Total loss of rolling 
control
All phases in flight Loss of control, crash Catastrophic
Loss of single aileron All phases in flight Partial loss of rolling 
control, but 
controllable
Hazardous
Uncommanded 
deflection of single 
aileron
All phases in flight Rolling motion out of 
control
Catastrophic
4.2. Control law safety requirements from failures of other airborne system
(1) Function definition
The required essentials of nose wheel steering function for FHA are defined in Table 3.
(2) Unsafe condition identification
Part of the FHA result of nose wheel steering function is shown in Table 4.
(3) Safety requirements analysis for control law design
If nose wheel steering is total lost in takeoff or landing phase, UAV could be turned by differential 
brake of main wheels or by deflection of rudder when high-speed taxing. Therefore, the following 
requirements for control law design could be obtained from total loss of nose wheel steering:
• Flight control law should have monitor and diagnostic ability to nose wheel steering control.
• Nose wheel steering, differential brake and rudder deflection should be utilized simultaneously in 
high-speed taxing for direction control
• When nose wheel steering is diagnosed lost, control authority of differential brake and rudder 
deflection should be enlarged appropriately to eliminate the possible directional divergence caused by 
loss of nose wheel steering.
512  GONG Lei and ZHANG Shuguang / Procedia Engineering 17 (2011) 505 – 5148 GONG Lei, ZHANG Shuguang / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000
Table 3. Essential definitions of nose wheel steering function
Function Nose wheel steering
Activation Condition Both nose wheel and main wheels touch down
Reaction Receiving nose wheel deflection signal from flight control system, 
controlling nose wheel deflection to achieve swerve when taxing
Functional Phase Motions on ground
Related Systems Flight control system, electric system, hydraulic system
Table 4. FHA results of nose wheel steering function (part)
Function Failure Conditions Phases Effects Classification
Nose wheel 
steering
Total loss of nose 
wheel steering
Takeoff
landing
Probably crash out of 
runway
Hazardous
Total loss of nose 
wheel steering
All phases in flight No effect on flight No Effects
Table 5. Essential definitions of parachute manual release function
Function Parachute manual release control
Human/Machine Interface Parachute manual release switch
Pilot Input Pilot press the release switch
System Reaction Parachute bay is opened, parachute is released
Function Effects Vehicle decelerates
Related Systems Flight control system, electric system
Table 6. Human hazard analysis result of parachute manual release function (part)
Function Failure Conditions Phases Effects Classification
Parachute manual 
release control
Release parachute too 
early
Landing Nose wheel not touch 
down on ground, 
aerodynamic moment 
of parachute might 
causing UAV pitching 
up
Hazardous
Release parachute 
unintentionally
All phases in flight Probably loss control, 
UAV crash
Catastrophic
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4.3. Control law safety requirements from pilot operating error
(1) Function definition
To perform a human hazard analysis for manual release function of decelerating parachute system, we 
define the required essentials of the chosen function for human hazard analysis as in Table 5.
(2) Unsafe condition identification
Part of the human hazard analysis result of parachute manual release function is shown in Table 6.
(3) Safety requirements analysis for control law design
The following requirements for control law design could be obtained from the above human hazard 
analysis of parachute manual release function:
• To prevent pilot from releasing parachute too early in landing taxing, flight control law should be 
designed to hold the manual release command back before all three wheels touch down in landing.
• To prevent pilot from releasing parachute in flight, there should be safety logic in flight control law to 
eliminate the manual release command when UAV is in flight.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a systematic approach of safety requirement analysis, validation and verification 
for UAV flight control law safety design by incorporating the hazard identification concept of system 
safety analysis into control law development process.
The unified approach, which integrates failure hazard identification and control law applicability 
assessment, could form a systematic set of safety requirements for flight control law design from failures 
of both flight control system and other airborne systems. From human error analysis on human/machine 
interfaces of applicable airborne systems, requirements of safety logic design for preventing pilot 
operating error in flight could be obtained for control law design.
Analysis approach proposed in this paper is effective in identification of safety requirements for UAV 
control law design.
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